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Pre-approval clinical trials cannot possibly ensure that a drug
will not have disastrous side effects once it arrives on the mar-
ket. Post-approval drug safety data gathering was put in place to
address this problem, but as implemented, it has not proven to be
as effective as hoped. Congress recently overhauled the legisla-
tion regarding post-approval drug risk identification, and in
doing so made a deliberate decision to put much of the burden of
post-approval drug surveillance on the FDA through data min-
ing. Further, the legislation gave the FDA the power to require
post-approval clinical trials from drug makers only in limited
circumstances. While this arrangement might seem wrong at
first, the system, properly implemented, likely represents the
most efficient option for risk identification at present. Still, to
optimize the system, the FDA and HHS will have to cooperate to
ensure that electronic health records are integrated into the data
mining prospects. This active post-market risk identification sys-
tem also has the potential to revolutionize other aspects of drug
regulation, like off-label use, and the requirement for pre-
approval clinical trials.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), created by the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1906 ("FDCA"),' has duties that range from
ensuring that food products are not adulterated to approving the labeling
of drugs shipped in interstate commerce.2 One of the most famous, and
arguably one of the most important roles of the FDA, is to ensure that
drugs sold in the United States are safe and effective. The recent events
surrounding the removal of Vioxx from the market illuminate the need
to consider additional ways to ensure the safety and effectiveness of
drugs in the United States. This Note examines recent legislation which
requires the FDA to execute a program of active post-market risk identi-
fication and proposes that mining data in electronic health records will
optimize this system. This Note also compares the statutory active post-
market risk identification system to a popular risk-surveillance alterna-
tive-requiring post-approval clinical trials for all drugs-and concludes
that the active post-market risk identification system is superior. Finally,
this Note identifies other aspects of drug regulation that may be affected
by the recent legislation.
A. FDA as Gatekeeper
No drug may be introduced into interstate commerce unless it has
been approved by the FDA. The FDA's role as gatekeeper of the drug
market was introduced in the 1962 amendments to the FDCA.5 The drug
approval process begins when a drug maker submits an Investigational
New Drug ("IND") application after pre-clinical research identifies a
promising drug candidate. With an FDA-approved IND application, the
drug maker is authorized to begin clinical trials to test the safety and ef-
ficacy of the drug candidate.
The FDA requires three phases of clinical trials before a drug candi-
date can be approved for commercial use. In Phase I, the drug candidate
1. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-99 (2006).
2. See History of the FDA, http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/historyoffda/default.htm
(last visited Feb. 10, 2009).
3. See Gina Kolata, MERCK and VIOXX: The Overview; A Widely Used Arthritis
Drug Is Withdrawn, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. I, 2004, at AI.
4. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 505(a), 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2008).
5. Act of October 10, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962).
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is usually administered to healthy volunteers in order to determine ap-
propriate dosage levels.6 Studies in this phase will also gather data
regarding pharmacokinetics, metabolism and side effects of taking the
drug candidate.7 Sometimes, preliminary data regarding effectiveness
also come out of a Phase I trial.8 If toxicity problems are identified in
Phase I, the FDA may impose a clinical hold which prohibits the drug
study from advancing to Phase II trials. 9
Phase II clinical trials typically involve several hundred patients who
have the condition that the drug candidate is intended to treat.'0 In most
circumstances, Phase II trials are well-controlled and closely moni-
tored." In Phase II, safety data (including reports of adverse events) are
also recorded. Typically, if Phase II data indicate that the drug candidate
does improve the condition of patients, and no untoward safety concerns
are raised, the drug candidate will be submitted to a final pre-approval
trial in Phase 111.12
A Phase III trial generally involves several hundred to several thou-
sand patients who also have the condition the drug candidate is intended
to treat.'3 This larger sample allows greater statistical power to determine
whether the drug candidate alleviates symptoms and is safe to use at the
effective doses. Phase III trials will sometimes compare the drug candi-
date to existing treatments, although the approval process does not
currently require that a drug candidate be safer or more effective than
existing treatments.'
4
If a company successfully shepherds its drug candidate through
Phase 1-111 clinical trials, it can then submit a New Drug Application
("NDA") to the FDA for approval. The NDA must include the data that
were generated in the clinical trials; the FDA examines this data to de-
termine whether the drug candidate is safe and effective.' 5 If the FDA
6. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE CDER HANDBOOK 8 (1998), avail-
able at http://www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/.
7. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2005).
8. Id.
9. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 6, at 8.
10. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21.
1. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 6, at 8.
12. Id. at 8-9.
13. 21 C.ER. § 312.21(d) (2005).
14. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2008).
15. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.50-.53 (2008). In making this determination, the FDA balances
the risks against the benefits. See Linda Bren, Cancer Drugs: Weighing the Risks and Benefits,
41 FDA CONSUMER MAG. (Jan-Feb. 2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/
2007/107_cancer.html. In cases where the benefits are great or the therapeutic options are
limited, greater risks will be tolerated. For example, many cancer drugs are also carcinogenic.
Mikhail Blagosklonny, Carcinogenesis, Cancer Therapy and Chemoprevention, 12 CELL
DEATH & DIFFERENTIATION 592, 592 (2005).
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finds that the drug candidate is safe and effective, and other technical
requirements are met, it will approve the NDA and the drug candidate
can be legally marketed and sold in the United States.
6
While the FDA approval process gives a drug candidate the
imprimatur of hard science, there are obvious shortcomings with this
risk assessment system. For instance, while clinical trials often involve
hundreds or thousands of patients, these samples are still too small to
statistically resolve some uncommon but disastrous side-effects."
Additionally, because Phase III trials generally last only one to four
years, side effects that develop over a longer time period will not
manifest themselves.'8 Furthermore, a growing chorus of researchers
caution that women, minorities and other groups are grossly
underrepresented in clinical trials.' 9 This raises the possibility that safety
and efficacy data generated in the trials may mislead doctors in treating
the underrepresented groups.20 Some also claim that the FDA approval
process is flawed because of agency capture, or conflicts of interest with
individuals involved in the approval process.2' Finally, others argue that
the pre-approval gatekeeping regime unduly delays the entry of
important drugs onto the market.
Various solutions have been proposed to fix these shortcomings, but
one of the most prominent is the practice of post-market risk identifica-
tion for drugs used by consumers.2 3 While post-market surveillance of
16. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(1), (d) (2008).
17. The most famous recent example is Vioxx, where the pre-approval data showed
hints of cardiovascular side effects that were not statistically significant. It was not until a
post-approval trial was conducted that the harmful side effects came to light. Kolata, supra
note 3, at Al.
18. See MAYO CLINIC, CLINICAL TRIALS: A CHANCE TO TRY EVOLVING THERAPIES,
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/clinical-trials/DI0033 (last visited Feb. 11, 2009).
19. EDICT PROJECT, CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION AND CONTROL RESEARCH CEN-
TER AT BAYLOR COLLEGE OF MEDICINE, MAJOR DEFICIENCIES IN THE DESIGN AND FUNDING
OF CLINICAL TRIALS: A REPORT TO THE NATION IMPROVING ON How HUMAN STUDIES ARE
CONDUCTED (2008), http://www.bcm.edu/edict/PDF/EDICTProjectWhite-Paper.pdf.
20. It is unclear whether the underrepresented groups actually will respond differently.
For example, race is generally considered a poor surrogate for genetic variability. See The
HapMap Project, Ethical Concerns, http://www.hapmap.org/ethicalconcems.html.en (last
visited Feb. 11, 2009) ("[Clommon ideas about race emerge largely from social and cultural
interactions and are only loosely connected to biological ancestry.").
21. For example, drug advisory committees are composed of "experts" that recommend
whether to approve a product based on data submitted with an NDA. USA Today reported that
54 percent of these experts had a financial stake in the outcome, including ownership of stock,
research grants and consulting arrangements with the company submitting the NDA. Dennis
Cauchon, FDA Advisers Tied to Industry, USA TODAY, Sept. 25, 2000, at Al.
22. See James L. Zelenay, Jr., The Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Is a Faster Food
and Drug Administration Always a Better Food and Drug Administration?, 60 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 261 (2005).
23. See Marcia Crosse, Director Health Care, Drug Safety: Further Actions Needed to
Improve FDA's Postmarket Decision-Making Process (May 9, 2007), in U.S. Gov'T Ac-
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drugs may patch some of the inherent shortcomings of the clinical trial
system, prior to the enactment of the Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of 2007 ("FDAAA"), it was a very inadequate patch.24
B. Beyond Gatekeeping
Before the passage of the FDAAA, the FDA's major post-market risk
surveillance tools comprised: (1) mandatory Adverse Drug Experience
("ADE") reporting; (2) voluntary reporting of side effects by physicians;
and (3) and post-approval clinical trials.
Mandatory ADE reports require drug makers to forward any infor-
mation they receive regarding a drug's harmful side effects to the FDA.25
If the adverse effect is "serious and unexpected," the drug manufacturer
must report this information within 15 days and promptly investigate the
event.26 Otherwise, drug manufacturers submit quarterly ADE reports for
the first three years post-approval, followed by yearly reports thereafter.
2 7
While helpful, this system is criticized as not being clear and effec-
tive, and not adequately establishing the actual extent of drug safety
28problems. For example, drug companies have a very strong financial
incentive to delay the release of ADE data, avoid classifying adverse
events as "serious and unexpected," or not submit data at all. 29 The FDA
has been criticized for failing to bring actions against companies that do
30
not submit ADE data in a timely manner.
The second tool used for post-approval drug surveillance-
independent reporting by practitioners-is also subject to criticism. First,
many doctors fail to report side effects. For example, doctors may not
recognize that a common ailment (e.g., a heart attack) is actually linked
to the use of a certain drug, or they may simply lack the infrastructure or
incentives to consistently report adverse events. Unfortunately, it is esti-
mated that medical practitioners report only about 10 percent of harmful
COUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-856T, 2007, at 3-4, available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d07856t.pd f.
24. It is possible that the current post-market risk-identification regime is the most
efficient system, despite the fact that many harmful drugs are not pulled from the market in a
timely manner. Still, Congress' amendments to the system are an indication of the popular
opinion that post-market risk identification could function better. See also id. at 2.
25. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 505(k)(1), 21 U.S.C. §355(k)(1) (2008); 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.80(a) (2008).
26. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c) (2008).
27. Id.
28. Crosse, supra note 23, at 8.
29. Failing to classify an adverse event as "serious and unexpected" would allow the
drug company to delay reporting of the event.
30. See Marc Kaufman, Reports to FDA Were Late, Watchdog Says, WASH. POST, Aug.
4, 2004, at E2.
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drug side effects,3' which reduces the likelihood that the FDA will rec-
ognize the correlation between the drug and the harmful effect. Indeed,
even when reports are made, the FDA may not act on them unless it re-
ceives similar reports from many practitioners.
Post-approval, or Phase IV, clinical trials represent the third and
most analytically powerful pre-FDAAA tool for identifying drug risks.
Phase IV trials are generally longer than pre-approval trials, and can in-
clude a much broader range of individuals, thus alleviating some of the
shortcomings of pre-approval trials. Yet, these trials were not a viable
source of post-approval risk data because the FDA lacked the power to
compel drug manufacturers to complete them.4 The FDA could extract
promises from drug companies to complete Phase IV studies, but once
approval was granted, the financial incentive to complete the trials in a
timely manner disappeared. As a result, many Phase IV trials are still
pending."
In conclusion, pre-FDAAA post-approval risk-assessment tools were
inadequate. In the FDAAA, Congress addressed this problem by requir-
ing the FDA to implement a risk identification system based on data-
mining, and allowing the FDA to require Phase IV clinical trials when
other methods of risk assessment are deemed inadequate. The balance of
this paper will: (1) describe the new regime of post-market risk identifi-
cation; (2) explore how it might be optimally implemented; and
(3) compare it economically to a popular risk-assessment alternative.
II. THE NEW REGIME OF POST-MARKET RISK REGULATION
On September 27, 2007, the FDAAA was signed into law.36 It consti-
tutes one of the largest revisions of the FDCA in several decades and
deals with many issues. In particular, some of the most interesting
31. See Marc Kaufman, Drug Safety Panel is Criticized, WASH. POST, June 8, 2005, at
A5.
32. See Geeta Anand, Jaw Ailment Shows Industry Moves Slowly on Drug Warnings,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2004, at BI (describing the experience of a doctor who tried for two
years to convince the FDA that a cancer drug was causing osteonecrosis in patients).
33. Lisa R. Johnson-Pratt, Phase IV Drug Development: Post-Marketing Studies, in
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF PHARMACEUTICAL MEDICINE 119 (Andrew J. Fletcher et al.
eds., 2d ed. 2007).
34. The FDA now has the authority to require clinical trials, but only under the limited
circumstances discussed below. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 505(o)(3)(D), 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(o)(3)(D) (2008).
35. See 65% of Promised Drug Studies Pending, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2006, at A4.
36. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121
Stat. 823 (2007).
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changes to the FDCA address the problems of post-market risk identifi-
cation.
A. Active Post-Market Risk Identification
The changes to post-approval risk identification are found in Title IX
of the FDAAA, "Enhanced Authorities Regarding Post-market Safety of
Drugs." In particular, Sections 901 and 905 make major structural
changes to the actual process of post-market risk surveillance. Section
901, which amends Section 505(o) of the FDCA, authorizes the FDA to
require that drug makers perform post-market, or Phase IV clinical trials,
but only under limited circumstances. The FDA may only require Phase
IV clinical trials when the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services ("HHS") 31 finds that: (1) post-market risk identification
provisions in FDCA Sections 505(k)(1) and (3) are inadequate; and (2) a
less rigorous "study" is likewise inadequate. This will not please those
who advocate mandatory Phase IV trials of all approved drugs.39
Sections 505(k)(1) and (3) list the preferred post-market risk identi-
fication systems. Section 505(k)(1) sets out the requirement, mentioned
previously, that a drug manufacturer keep a record of and report the
negative clinical outcomes from post-approval drug use.4° On the other
hand, Section 505(k)(3) was added by Section 905 of the FDAAA, and
represents a new approach to post-market risk identification. It requires
the FDA to "develop methods to obtain access to disparate data
sources,,4' and also develop and implement a "postmarket risk identifica-
42tion and analysis system" based on those methods. The methods must
be developed by September 2009, and the system must be implemented
no later than September 2010.43 The overall goal is to "link and analyze
safety data from multiple sources,'"44 including "claims data, patient sur-
vey data, standardized analytic files that allow for the pooling and
analysis of data from disparate data environments, and any other data
deemed appropriate by the Secretary."
45
Section 905 of the FDAAA also adds Section 505(k)(4) to the
FDCA, directing the FDA to collaborate with public and private entities
37. The Secretary does not actually make this decision, but will delegate it to the FDA.
38. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 505(o)(3)(D), 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3)(D) (2007).
39. Mark Greener, Drug Safety on Trial, 6 EMBO REPORTs 202, 202 (2005).
40. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 505(k)(1); 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(a).
41. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 505(k)(3)(B)-(C).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. § 505 (k)(3)(B).
45. Id. § 505(k)(3)(A).
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to perform advanced query analyses with the data system.46 The FDA can
also contract for the same services.47 Congress has instructed the FDA to
include in these analyses data from at least 25 million patients by 2010
and 100 million patients by 2012 48-nearly eighteen-thousand times as
many individuals as the mean total enrollment in pre-clinical trials.49
The appeal of this approach is immense: if sufficient access to qual-
ity data is secured, this system becomes analogous to a continuous,
massive post-approval "clinical trial" with the potential for ongoing
feedback into the risks of the drug in practice. Additionally, the FDA will
be guiding the research, so gamesmanship by the regulated entities will
not potentially muddle data. Further, the potential scope of the data
analysis is so large that statistical analyses will be able to identify low
probability risks.
While the system promises many benefits, it will also incur costs.
The FDA must develop complex methods and systems for data gathering
and analysis. Because of the enormity of the data set, and the over-
whelming number of potential drug safety queries, these data-mining
activities could be a bottomless pit of resource consumption. To avoid
overspending, Congress requires that drug safety questions be addressed
in a prioritized order established biannually through consultation with
the Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committee or its suc-
cessor." Still, this does not necessarily limit the costs; it only establishes
which risks are most likely to be addressed.
The true question, then, is whether the new regime maximizes the
potential net benefits5' available through post-approval risk identification
systems. In response, this paper will first explore how the active post-
market risk identification system established by Congress in Section 905
of the FDAAA can be optimized. This "optimal" system will then be
compared to the other main post-approval risk identification system:
mandatory Phase IV clinical trials for all drugs.
B. Optimizing the Congressional Mandate
Congress gave very few specific instructions to the FDA regarding
(1) which data sources to mine; (2) how to ensure ongoing access to up-
46. Id. § 505(k)(4)(A). For example, the FDA might wonder whether a recently ap-
proved drug causes an increased incidence of a certain condition in users. It could query the
health data to see if there is a correlation between the two.
47. Id. §§ 505(k)(3)(C)(v), 505(k)(4)(D), 505(k)(4)(F), 505(k)(4)(G).
48. Id. § 505(k)(3)(B)(ii).
49. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Develop-
ment Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 177 n.41 (2003).
50. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 505(k)(4)(C).
51. The total benefits of the system minus its costs of implementation, and any other
incidental costs.
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dated drug safety information; and (3) which data-mining techniques to
use in drug safety queries. The third issue is a concern for database and
information processing professionals. For the purpose of this paper, I
assume that the FDA will choose the appropriate data-mining and analy-
sis techniques for each risk question that is presented. This leaves the
task of optimizing the first two issues.
1. Data Sources
The FDAAA lists two potential sources of data for the active post-
market risk identification system: (1) "federal health-related electronic
data (such as data from the Medicare program and the health systems of
the Department of Veterans Affairs);" and (2) "private sector health-
related electronic data (such as pharmaceutical purchase data and health
insurance claims data). 5 2 Beyond this, the statute merely directs the
FDA to choose "other data as the Secretary deems necessary to create a
robust system . . . ."" Both potential sources specifically mentioned
comprise mostly health insurance account data or analogous government
files.
Health insurance account data contains records of which drugs were
prescribed to an individual for a particular condition. An insurance ac-
count file will also include claims for diagnoses of any conditions that
arise after the drug is prescribed to the patient. Thus, if the FDA receives
several ADEs reporting an adverse reaction associated with a certain
drug, the FDA could then search insurance claim data to determine in
general whether individuals who are prescribed the drug are more likely
to be diagnosed with the putative adverse side effect.-'
Still, there are drawbacks to mining health insurance claim records for
safety analysis. Most importantly, insurance claim data do not include
positive outcomes from use of a drug. 5 This is unfortunate because the
FDA typically assesses the safety and efficacy of a drug by balancing its
harms against its benefits. Thus, even if a drug risk is identified, the FDA
may still not have enough information to decide whether to allow the drug
52. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 505(k)(3)(C)(i)(III).
53. Id.
54. Of course, limits would have to be put on the search. For example, the search would
likely require that the drug in question was prescribed recently to improve the likelihood of
seeing causal connections. These limits are specific to the data-mining and statistical analysis
process, and as stated before, I assume that the FDA will strive to optimize its search algo-
rithms.
55. For example, if I am treated with a drug for a condition, the insurance reflects this,
but my insurance provider will likely not be notified if my condition improves with treatment.
The only evidence that I was healed would be a cessation of treatment.
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to stay on the market.56 For example, imagine a drug that is prescribed to
treat childhood leukemia that was originally approved by the FDA for
treatment of breast cancer in adults. No children were enrolled in the
pre-approval clinical trials. However, due to very encouraging results (a
few cases of miraculous recovery) from off-label use in some children,
the drug became widely prescribed in children. One doctor reports a fatal
aortic aneurism in a pediatric patient after treatment with the drug. A
data-mining query confirms an elevated risk of fatal cardiovascular
events in children with use of the drug. Here, the FDA is faced with a
confirmed risk, but only anecdotal information regarding benefits, so a
traditional risk-benefit analysis will be stymied.
This might seem to imply that data-mining will not be very effective
in general for post-market risk identification; however, this is not the
case. The problems with insurance claim data can be avoided. HHS is
currently following a worldwide trend of pushing the incorporation of
Electronic Health Records ("EHRs") into American healthcare.57 Presi-
dent Bush set a "goal for most Americans to have access to secure
electronic health records by 2014.""8 EHRs contain all of the information
regarding a patient under a physician's care. While they include all of the
information found in a typical insurance claim record, they are much
richer. EHRs include the results from tests performed to confirm diagno-
ses, as well as positive outcomes from treatment.5 9
If EHRs could be incorporated as a data source in post-market risk
surveillance,6 data-miners would have access to the same types of in-
formation as obtained in typical clinical trials. Thus, data-miners would
be able to ascertain to some degree the benefits as well as the risks of a
56. The FDA might alternatively require labeling changes or other solutions if it could
assess the risk-benefit ratio, but it is prohibited from doing so.
57. The present justification for the use of EHRs is to correct problems with current
medical record-keeping techniques. Generally, an individual will have a health record on file
with multiple providers, but EHRs are designed to centralize and standardize medical record
keeping. EHRs will be portable, and should reduce (sometimes fatal) errors in medical care
while increasing transparency in the industry generally. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human
Servs., Nationwide Health Information Network (NHIN): Background, http://www.hhs.gov/
healthit/healthnetwork/background/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2009).
58. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., Health Information Technology, American
Health Information Community, http://www.hhs.gov/healthit/community/background/ (last
visited Feb. 14, 2009). The system imagines a nationwide health information network, which
will "provide a secure, nationwide, interoperable health information infrastructure that will
connect providers, consumers, and others involved in supporting health and healthcare." U.S.
Dept. of Health and Human Servs., supra note 57.
59. See Richard Bordowitz, Electronic Health Records: A Primer, 39 LABMEDICINE
301,301 (2008).
60. EHRs would need to be stripped of all identifying information, as insurance claim
data would also have to be. Indeed, most risk-data sources raise HIPAA privacy rule issues,
but these are not insurmountable if the right methods are built in from the beginning.
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drug in a large segment of all patients taking the drug. HHS is attempt-
ing to guide the uptake of EHRs so that they will be machine readable
and based on compatible standards. 6' This common information architec-
ture will allow easier access to a massive number of records for data-
mining.
2. Ongoing and Continuous Access
A successful active post-market risk identification system will also
optimize the availability of ongoing and continuous access to data. A
potential problem with insurance claim data as a source of data-mining
is the plethora of insurance providers. An individual may change provid-
ers for many reasons: to save money, because coverage with the current
provider is not available after moving to another region, or merely be-
cause his employer decides to change plans. All of these scenarios will
destroy the information continuity that is required to establish and main-
tain a robust active post-market risk identification system. While this
discontinuity in insurance claim records is likely not a fatal flaw to the
system, it will undoubtedly hamper the ability to find real risks by intro-
ducing false negatives 62
Fortunately, this difficulty can be ameliorated by introducing EHRs
as a data source. EHRs will be implemented in a way to ensure that the
record remains with a patient instead of a provider. Thus, even if an indi-
vidual moves across the country, the EHR containing all of the
individual's medical history will be available to his new doctors. This
ongoing and continuous record of data will also allow FDA data-miners
to query whether particular side effects are more common in long-term
users of certain drugs.
In sum, optimizing the active post-market risk identification system
will require that HHS and the FDA cooperate to ensure that EHRs be-
come available as a data source. Since both programs are set to be
• 61
accomplished over the same period, the timing could not be better for
cooperation between the two projects.
61. See U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., supra note 57. See also Exec. Order
13,410, 3 C.F.R. § 240 (2007), proposed amendment in 42 U.S.C.A. § 300 (2008).
62. For example, a person may begin taking a drug and charge the drug to his first in-
surance provider. After the drug cycle is completed, the individual changes insurance
providers and experiences a side effect of the drug that is billed to the second insurance car-
rier. There will be no linkage in the data between the drug prescription and the adverse event.
63. The post-market risk identification system is slated to include 100 million patients
by 2012, Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 505(k)(3)(B)(ii), and EHRs are to be available to
most Americans by 2014. See U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., supra note 57.
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C. "Data-Mining First" vs. "Required Phase IV Trials"
Despite passage of the FDAAA, some still argue that all drugs
should be provisionally approved subject to a requirement that Phase IV
clinical trials be performed in a timely manner.64 Thus, it will be helpful
to compare a required Phase IV ("RPIV") regime to the one laid out in
the FDAAA, which requires data-mining first ("DMF'). Recall that the
latter will still allow the FDA to require Phase IV trials, but only if it is
determined that the data-mining system is found to be inadequate.65
1. Financing the Systems
Although DMF and RPIV appear at first to be financed in very dif-
ferent ways, with either system, the American public foots the bill. As
currently legislated by Congress, DMF will be funded by the FDA-
meaning tax revenue will pay for the increase in drug safety. On the
other hand, RPIV expenses incurred by drug companies would be passed
on to drug consumers in the form of higher drug prices. The higher drug
prices would be spread over the American public through higher insur-
ance premiums. Assuming most Americans carry health insurance and
pay taxes, either system will pass the costs on to the public.
66
Since the costs will be distributed over the American public regard-
less of the mechanism of financing, the total costs of each system will be
compared next.6 A key assumption for the purpose of this comparison is
that the director of the FDA will correctly recognize when data-mining is
insufficient to identify public health risks, and a Phase IV clinical trial is
required. Under that assumption, the public health outcomes in DMF and
RPIV would be the same, and public health costs and benefits do not
need to be factored into the comparison.
By factoring out hard-to-quantify public health costs and benefits it
is possible to express the cost differential between RPIV and DMF
64. See, e.g., Greener, supra note 39, at 202.
65. As mentioned previously, supra note 24, there is a technical possibility that the
system in place before passage of the FDAAA is more efficient than either option discussed in
this section. Besides being politically unpalatable, the pre-FDAAA system's relative cheap-
ness is likely outweighed by its failure to identify many harmful drugs. A formal comparison
of DMF and RPIV to the previous system is outside the scope of this paper.
66. This is overly simplistic, as health insurance and taxes do not distribute costs iden-
tically. Still, while any individual is unlikely to bear the same fraction of the costs under the
system, for the purposes of this economic analysis, the only consideration is which regime has
a greater aggregate cost to society.
67. It may be more politically tenable to have the drug companies "pay their way," thus
favoring the RPIV model where the drug companies appear to be bearing the costs. Indeed,
DMF might be further optimized by amending the statute to require any drug company with a
drug on the market to pay a percentage of their gross revenue on the drug to fund the active
post-market risk identification system. This would remove the system's funding from the va-
garies of budget appropriations.
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mathematically. Under DMF, Phase IV clinical trials will still be per-
formed, but only when data-mining fails. Given that the variable T
represents the total cost of RPIV (i.e., the cost of performing a Phase IV
trial on every approved drug), and the variable t represents the total cost
of the clinical trial component of DMF,6 8 then the difference in clinical
trial costs between these systems (expressed as ACri,) will be:
(1) AC,ials :_ T- t
This can be rewritten as:
(2) t = T- ACfa,
Let M represent the cost of the data-mining component of DMF, so
that the total cost of DMF can be expressed as M + t. Since the total cost
of RPIV is T, the difference between the total cost of RPIV and the total
cost of DMF (expressed as AC,,,) will be:
(3) AC,,,, = T - (M + t)
Now, substituting equation (2) for t in equation (3):
(4) AC,o = T - (M + T - AC,.,,)
This simplifies to:
(5) ACo, = AC, ri., - M
Under the assumptions stated above, if AC,o, is positive, DMF is
cheaper to implement, and vice versa. AC,,,, is only positive (and DMF
the cheaper option) when M < AC,ios. 69
Under a further set of assumptions, it is possible to perform a con-
crete analysis determining whether DMF is less expensive than RPIV.
First, assume that the average cost of a Phase IV clinical trial is $86 mil-
lion,70 or about $0.75 per household per trial' Second, the analysis will
68. T will always be greater than t unless the data-mining component of DMF is unable
to identify any post-approval drug risks and the FDA is forced to require Phase IV clinical
trials for every drug anyway. In such a case, T = t.
69. Intuitively this makes sense: if the cost of data-mining (Al) does not consume the
savings of having fewer clinical trials under DMF (ACtrials), then DMF is cheaper than RPIV.
70. See DiMasi et al., supra note 49, at 162 (concluding that the average cost of a Phase
III clinical trial was $86 million, inflation-adjusted to the dollar value in the year 2000). Given
the scarcity of data regarding the actual cost of a phase IV clinical trial, the figure for a Phase
III trial will be used.
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be restricted to new molecular entity ("NME") approvals only, not re-
formulations of previously approved drugs.72 Third, assume that 30
NMEs will be approved per year.73 Thus, RPIV would cost roughly
$2,580,000,000, or $22 per household. 74 This represents the total cost of
RPIV (T in formulas 1-4) under these assumptions.
With regards to DMF, it can be assumed that half of all drugs ap-
proved by the FDA will have an adverse side effect.75 Additionally, it can
be assumed that data-mining will, at a minimum, flag all drugs with ad-
verse side effects as potentially harmful, but that the rate of false
positives is moderate (e.g., 20 percent of all approved drugs are inappro-
priately flagged as potentially harmful). 76 Further, it can be assumed that
data-mining is unable to determine the risk/benefit ratio for drugs
flagged as suspicious. 77 Therefore, a Phase IV clinical trial will be re-
quired whenever a risk is identified under DMF. Under these
assumptions, AC,,, becomes the cost of performing clinical trials on 30
78 79percent of all approved NMEs,76 or $774 million per year.
Recall that under equation (5), it was concluded that DMF is less
costly than RPIV when M < AC,o. Under the assumptions above, DMF
71. This is to provide an idea of the individual cost burden of a clinical trial. There
were 114,384,000 households in the United States in 2006. U.S. Census Bureau, America's
Families and Living Arrangements: 2006, at tbl.AVGI, http://www.census.gov/population/
www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2006.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2009). Thus, if a phase IV trial
costs $86 million and there are 114,384,000 households, the cost per household is
$86,000,000 divided by 114,384,000, or $0.75.
72. NMEs will benefit most from an active post-market risk identification system as
there has been little clinical experience with them. On the other hand, an extended release
form for a well-known drug is less likely to have unknown harmful side effects.
73. See TUFTS CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEVELOPMENT, OUTLOOK 2006 at 1
(2006), available at http://csdd.tufts.edu/InfoServices/OutlookPDFs/Outlook2006.pdf (about
30 NMEs were approved per year on average in the period from 1999-2004).
74. Remember, it was assumed that the costs would be passed on to consumers either
through higher taxes or higher insurance premiums. The per household number is obtained by
dividing the total cost, $2,580,000,000, by 114,384,000 total households.
75. This assumption is based on a study which concluded that over half of all drugs
approved between 1976 and 1985 had serious side effects which were discovered only after
approval. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FDA DRUG REVIEW: POST APPROVAL RISKS 1976-
85 at 3 (1990).
76. This is a reasonable estimate because higher sensitivity in any detection system
generally leads to higher rates of false positives.
77. This is a conservative estimate of the capability of the post-market risk identifica-
tion system. Hopefully, the results will be better. As explained above, by using EHRs the FDA
may be able to perform enough risk/benefit balancing to avoid a clinical trial in some cases.
Making this assumption allows for the determination of the minimal cost savings of DMF
relative to RPIV. A less conservative assumption will yield even greater savings for DMF.
78. The harmful drugs (50 percent of the total), plus the false positives (20 percent of
total) result in 70 percent of all drugs needing clinical trials under DMF. Thus, the costs of 30
percent of trials under RPIV are saved under DMF
79. If T = $2,580,000,000 per year, supra note 74, and ACtrials = 0.3T, then ,JCtrials =
$774,000,000 per year.
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is the more economically efficient system of post-approval drug risk sur-
veillance if the yearly cost of its data-mining component (M) is less than
$774 million.
Unfortunately, predicting the costs of implementing FDAAA's active
post-market risk identification system is difficult due to a dearth of pric-
ing information regarding the implementation of data-mining schemes. It
is telling, however, that the 2008 FDA budget for modernizing drug
safety is set at only $11.2 million.8° This is a roughly 70-fold difference.
Indeed, due to the heavy use of computers in the DMF system, it is
likely that many operations could be automated. Thus, after initial costs
of implementation are invested, it is highly unlikely that the annual oper-
ating budget could surpass hundreds of millions of dollars. In this light,
it appears that DMF is the cheaper alternative.
2. Structural Safeguards
Safeguards built into the mechanics of these systems can ensure that
strategic gaming and human error do not compromise the systems' goal
of identifying post-approval risks. By comparing the safeguards incorpo-
rated in DMF and RPIV, the relative utility of the two systems can be
determined.
DMF will be administered by the FDA, a government agency, so it is
less likely that there will be financial pressure for the risk-surveying en-
tity to "cheat." RPIV, on the other hand, is administered by the drug
companies which have a financial stake in generating data consistent
with safety. While it is true that RPIV data would be reviewed by profes-
sionals at the FDA, drug companies have shown a particular adeptness in
discovering ways to maximize profits under the FDCA's regulatory
scheme.8' It can be assumed that they are equally imaginative in perform-
ing clinical trials. This is not meant to imply that drug companies are
corrupt-only that they will generate the "best possible" safety data.
While drug companies have some incentive to generate honest data to
reduce potential tort liability for harmful drugs which remain on the
market, since the federal preemption question regarding tort liability for
prescription drugs is unsettled,82 the strength of a drug manufacturer's
80. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Summary of FDA's FY 2008 Budget, http://
www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2008/summary.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2009). In fact, the
FDA would have to spend 37 percent of its entire budget request for 2008 of $2.1 billion on
DMF to match the estimated cost of RPIV.
81. For example, patent evergreening. See Michael Enzo Furrow, Pharmaceutical Pat-
ent Life-Cycle Management After KSR v. Teleflex, 63 FooD & DRUG L.J. 275, 276-77 (2008).
82. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249, currently pending before the Supreme
Court. Of course, the eventual decision in Wyeth may disambiguate preemption law to a great
extent.
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tort-based incentive is unclear. On balance, while the FDA lacks incen-
tives to "cheat" while administering DMF, drug makers have at least a
slight incentive to "massage" clinical trial data they generate under
RPIV.
Although the FDA lacks incentives to "cheat," under DMF it also
lacks compelling incentives to be as efficient as possible.83 Under RPIV,
on the other hand, drug companies face strong pressure to complete
Phase IV trials in a cost-effective manner.
Perhaps the most important structural benefit of DMF is its scope.
Data-mining is intended to eventually cover 100 million patients, which
would represent about one-third of all Americans. Because it will in-
clude so many individuals, it is likely that data from every kind of user
will be available and greater statistical resolution can be achieved. This
eliminates many shortcomings of clinical trials addressed in Part I.A.
Indeed, one reason clinical trial data are generated under well-observed
and standardized procedures is to ensure that the data are "clean" and
easier to interpret, because the results must be extrapolated from a small
sample to the whole population. With the data-mining scheme legislated
in the FDAAA, such a large sample will be queried that very little ex-
trapolation will be required.
In conclusion, while drug companies are more likely to efficiently
implement a post-market risk identification system, they also have at
least a slight incentive to "massage" clinical trial data they would gener-
ate under RPIV. On the other hand, while the FDA would likely
experience less pressure to either cheat or implement the system quickly
and efficiently, the large size of the data-mining sample tips the balance
of structural safeguards in favor of DMF.
III. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, if the DMF is implemented properly, it should be a
better policy choice than RPIV for post-approval risk identification.
First, it is less expensive to implement. This conclusion, however, is
based on many assumptions, the most important of which is that the
FDA, on its limited budget, can achieve substantially the same public
health benefits using either system. While this assumption is difficult to
prove, it is not unreasonable. Budget limitations would be less disruptive
to DMF if the FDA was allowed to charge fees to drug companies as
payment for the risk monitoring services they are providing. While costs
will likely be passed on to taxpayers/insureds anyway, it is likely that
83. The only pressure would be political pressure.
Post-Approval Risk Surveillance for Drugs
fees would be a politically more tenable source of funding than taxes.4
Second, while both systems have potential structural problems, the sheer
scope of the data-mining promises to ensure that the conclusions drawn
from DMF are more "honest."
Besides the allure of an efficient and better method of post-approval
risk identification, the data-mining component of DMF has the potential
to dramatically affect other aspects of drug regulation. For example, if,
as proposed in this paper, EHRs are included as a data source and the
tasks of data gathering and analysis can be automated, it might be possi-
ble to assess a drug's reactions in the public in "real time." While this
capability may not be economical using current technology, as internet
connection speeds and computing capacity increase, a system of truly
active risk assessment might be possible. In fact, if the Health Informa-
tion Technology Group at HHS and the FDA cooperate on the
implementation of EHRs, it will be possible to organize EHRs so that
automated scripts can search for both risks and positive outcomes from
new drugs. Predefined scripts could automatically screen many or all
approved drugs for a set of determined side effects.
This ability to gather risk/benefit data in real time would likely
transform the process of drug regulation-and raise many interesting
questions as well. First, it would allow for validation of off-label uses
that appear promising in the medical literature. Still, would this validat-
ing data be made available to drug companies for marketing purposes?
In particular, if the system is publicly funded, this could be seen as a
huge subsidy to the drug industry.
Second, could the data-mining system, if properly validated, further
replace some of the clunky pre-market clinical trial process? If reliable
data regarding the safety and effectiveness of a drug can be obtained while
the drug is on the market, perhaps only limited safety trials would need to
be performed before a drug is approved. This would allow terminally ill
patients access to promising new drugs as early in the drug life-cycle as
possible. Admittedly, if this avenue is eventually explored, regulators will
need to strike an appropriate balance to ensure that drugs allowed on the
market will have at least a baseline level of safety.
Third, might a data-mining system incorporating EHRs change the
types of drugs companies pursue for approval? Pharmacogenomics85
promises to take us into an era of personalized medicine. This transition
will be difficult, however, because the current system arguably incentiv-
84. See supra note 67.
85. Pharmacogenomics is a fledgling field that attempts to use genetic indicators in
patients to estimate a patient's response to a particular drug.
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izes drug companies to pursue only blockbuster drugs.f If drugs can en-
ter the market with fewer pre-market safety data requirements, drug
makers may be more willing to invest in smaller market genetically-
tailored drugs. Furthermore, as genotyping becomes more common, EHRs
will likely include a patient's genetic information and FDA data-miners
could then look for correlations between certain genotypes and outcomes
from drug use.
Whatever the eventual fate of data-mining post-market drug surveil-
lance, this legislative step will not only improve drug safety, but take us
to the brink of some very intriguing drug regulation measures.
86. The argument posits that the very high cost of the approval process will only be
undertaken when the drug is likely to generate huge revenues.
